The Super League project caused
major controversy in the football world when it first emerged around five years
ago. The lack of support from clubs in Germany and France, along with strong backlash
from fans—particularly in England and other countries involved—led many of the
founding clubs to quickly withdraw from the project. As far as I know, only two
of the original 12 founding clubs still stand behind it: Real Madrid and
Barcelona.
Most people who closely follow
football are already familiar with this process. Instead of retelling the
story, I want to focus on three key questions:
1)What do these clubs need to do
in order for the Super League to actually happen?
2)What should the other clubs do
to prevent it from happening?
3)If left to proceed freely,
would this project actually achieve its intended goals?
I will address the second and
third questions in a follow-up article. This current piece will focus solely on
the first question.
One of the main reasons this
project faced such intense backlash from day one was the fact that it was
largely conducted in secrecy, aside from a few media leaks. Although there were
some rumors circulating a few months before the announcement, to my knowledge,
no official statement was made by any executive. The strongest reaction to
these rumors centered around the closed-league format—that certain clubs would
have guaranteed spots regardless of performance. When the project was formally
announced, around 80% of football fans were probably hearing about it for the
first time, and this lack of transparency was one of the core issues. The
entire initiative was carried out behind the backs of the fans.
In football, the real owners of
any club are always its supporters. Even if individuals or investment funds
technically own a club, without its fans there’s no way to generate revenue—or
even enjoyment—from the game. Think back to the pandemic era: did anyone truly
enjoy matches played behind closed doors? Didn’t some leagues go so far as to
add artificial crowd sounds and digital fans to the broadcasts just to maintain
a sense of normalcy? So how could the founding clubs move forward with a
project of this magnitude without first preparing the ground and engaging their
fans? That, to me, was their fundamental mistake: failing to consult with their
core supporters and grossly underestimating the backlash.
Their second major mistake was
viewing themselves as inherently privileged. Football isn’t just about the
clubs that make it into an elite competition. It’s a deeply layered structure,
and if those at the top of the pyramid begin to believe they are untouchable,
they risk undermining the entire foundation. If the base of the pyramid were to
walk away, would those at the top still have anything to stand on? I’ll explore
this point more thoroughly when addressing the third question in my next
article, so I’ll leave it there for now.
Let’s put the past aside and consider things from the clubs’ perspective. Suppose I were a part of this project—an internal consultant, so to speak—and they asked me what must be done to make the Super League a reality. Here’s what I would say.
This is my vision for the Super
League project:
First and foremost, no club is given special privileges, but the interests of top clubs are still addressed. In fact, my system incorporates all clubs, not just a select few, into a broader, unified structure.
Currently, we have three major competition stages in European football: domestic leagues, domestic cups, and European competitions. I will address domestic cup reform in another article, so for now I’ll focus on the other two.
At present, the top divisions in England, Spain, and Italy consist of 20 teams. In Germany, France, and many other countries, it’s 18; in some, even 16. For this project to be realized, I propose that every top domestic league expands to 20 teams—a change that would not be too difficult, as second-division clubs would likely welcome the opportunity.
In leagues with 20 teams, clubs
currently play 38 domestic matches. Add to that 8 European matches in the group
stages, and you get 46 total matchweeks (though only some clubs continue into
the knockout rounds, which increases their total further). My project maintains
a similar total number of matchweeks, but rebalances them: reducing domestic
league fixtures slightly while expanding international matchweeks—with all
clubs participating in both phases.
Domestic League Phase –
Inspired by the new UEFA format:
The domestic league phase will
resemble the restructured format recently introduced in UEFA competitions
(Champions League, Europa League, Conference League).
Each 20-team league will seed
clubs into 4 pots based on their final standings from the previous season:
Pot 1: teams ranked 1st–5th
Pot 2: teams ranked 6th–10th
Pot 3: teams ranked 11th–15th
Pot 4: teams ranked 16th–17th,
plus the 3 promoted clubs
Each team will be drawn to play 8
matches against teams from various pots, including their own. Four games will
be at home, four away.
After these 8 matchweeks, the
domestic league phase ends, and the European phase begins.
European Phase – Inclusive and
Performance-Based
All 20 clubs from each country
will proceed to the European phase, seeded based on their domestic league
performance:
1st–4th → Tier 1
5th–8th → Tier 2
9th–12th → Tier 3
13th–16th → Tier 4
17th–20th → Tier 5
Each country will follow this
same system.
Next, based on UEFA country
coefficients, nations will be grouped into categories. Five countries will form
a collective unit to create five European leagues, each composed of 20 clubs (4
from each country).
In this international league,
each club will play home and away matches against all 19 other clubs in their
group—38 matches total.
Matchweek Balance
You might think the domestic
league feels too short with only 8 matches. However, remember: during the
European phase, a team will face 3 clubs from its own country within the
20-team group—accounting for 6 additional “domestic” matchups, making it
effectively 14 national league fixtures, albeit within a broader context.
Thus, without increasing the
number of matchweeks, we implement a more inclusive, merit-based, and globally
engaging system—balancing domestic identity with international competitiveness.
I will start explaining the
subject with visuals for a better understanding of the system:
The table on the left is the
table I created assuming that the league ended like this last season. That is
why I divided the teams into 4 different pots as seen in the colors when
starting this year. The team in each pot played 8 matches, including its own
pot, as I explained above, and its league ended. I assumed that the league
ranking on the right was formed at the end of the league.
Rank |
Teams |
Rank |
Teams |
|
1 |
Arsenal |
1 |
Liverpool |
|
2 |
Aston Villa |
2 |
Arsenal |
|
3 |
Bournemouth |
3 |
Manchester City |
|
4 |
Brentford |
4 |
Newcastle United |
|
5 |
Brighton |
5 |
Chelsea |
|
6 |
Chelsea |
6 |
Nottingham Forest |
|
7 |
Crystal Palace |
7 |
Aston Villa |
|
8 |
Everton |
8 |
Bournemouth |
|
9 |
Fulham |
9 |
Brentford |
|
10 |
Ipswich Town |
10 |
Brighton |
|
11 |
Leicester City |
11 |
Fulham |
|
12 |
Liverpool |
12 |
Crystal Palace |
|
13 |
Manchester City |
13 |
Wolverhampton |
|
14 |
Manchester United |
14 |
Everton |
|
15 |
Newcastle United |
15 |
Manchester United |
|
16 |
Nottingham Forest |
16 |
Tottenham Hotspur |
|
17 |
Southampton |
17 |
West Ham United |
|
18 |
Tottenham Hotspur |
18 |
Ipswich Town |
|
19 |
West Ham United |
19 |
Leicester City |
|
20 |
Wolverhampton |
20 |
Southampton |
Rank |
League A |
Rank |
League B |
Rank |
League C |
||
1 |
Liverpool |
1 |
Chelsea |
1 |
Brentford |
||
2 |
Arsenal |
2 |
Nottingham |
2 |
Brighton |
||
3 |
Manchester City |
3 |
Aston Villa |
3 |
Fulham |
||
4 |
Newcastle United |
4 |
Bournemouth |
4 |
Crystal Palace |
||
5 |
Barcelona |
5 |
Villarreal |
5 |
Osasuna |
||
6 |
Real Madrid |
6 |
Real Betis |
6 |
Mallorca |
||
7 |
Atletico Madrid |
7 |
Celta Vigo |
7 |
Sociedad |
||
8 |
Athletic Club |
8 |
Vallecano |
8 |
Valencia |
||
9 |
Napoli |
9 |
Roma |
9 |
Milan |
||
10 |
Inter |
10 |
Lazio |
10 |
Como |
||
11 |
Atalanta |
11 |
Bologna |
11 |
Torino |
||
12 |
Juventus |
12 |
Fiorentina |
12 |
Udinese |
||
13 |
Bayern Munich |
13 |
Dortmund |
13 |
Gladbach |
||
14 |
Leverkusen |
14 |
Leipzig |
14 |
Stutgart |
||
15 |
Freiburg |
15 |
Mainz |
15 |
Augsburg |
||
16 |
Frankfurt |
16 |
Werder Bremen |
16 |
Wolfsburg |
||
17 |
PSG |
17 |
Lille |
17 |
Brest |
||
18 |
Marseille |
18 |
Strassbourg |
18 |
Auxerre |
||
19 |
Monaco |
19 |
Lyon |
19 |
Rennes |
||
20 |
Nice |
20 |
Lens |
20 |
Toulouse |
Rank |
League D |
Rank |
League E |
|
1 |
Wolves |
1 |
West Ham |
|
2 |
Everton |
2 |
Ipswich |
|
3 |
Man United |
3 |
Leicester |
|
4 |
Tottenham |
4 |
Southampton |
|
5 |
Getafe |
5 |
Alaves |
|
6 |
Espanyol |
6 |
Las Palmas |
|
7 |
Girona |
7 |
Leganes |
|
8 |
Sevilla |
8 |
Valladolid |
|
9 |
Genoa |
9 |
Lecce |
|
10 |
Cagliari |
10 |
Venezia |
|
11 |
Verona |
11 |
Empoli |
|
12 |
Parma |
12 |
Monza |
|
13 |
Union |
13 |
Holsten Kiel |
|
14 |
St Pauli |
14 |
Bochum |
|
15 |
Hoffenheim |
15 |
Cologne |
|
16 |
Heidenheim |
16 |
Hamburg |
|
17 |
Reims |
17 |
St Ettienne |
|
18 |
Angers |
18 |
Le Havre |
|
19 |
Nantes |
19 |
Lorient |
|
20 |
Le Havre |
20 |
Paris FC |
In the proposed league structure,
particularly within Class A, most of the clubs that traditionally desire to
"compete with top teams throughout the season" will see this need largely
fulfilled.
Of course, there will be some exceptions. Based on current league standings, teams like Milan, Dortmund, Manchester United, and Tottenham do not qualify for Class A. If these clubs wish to compete at the top international tier, they will need to perform better in the domestic phase. And while that may seem like a loss, it is only temporary—unlike the current system, where a bad season can have long-term consequences, such as missing out on Champions League football the following year. My model offers a more balanced and forgiving structure, where seasonal performance has direct but non-permanent consequences.
Moreover, this format allows
clubs in the lower classes to represent their countries on the international
stage as well. They will compete against clubs of similar strength, which will
enhance match quality and overall spectator enjoyment.
Addressing Viewer Engagement
Concerns
A reasonable concern may arise:
Why would a fan follow another class if their team plays in a higher one?
Or more specifically: Who would
watch Osasuna vs. Auxerre if Inter vs. PSG is on at the same time?
Here’s how I plan to address
that:
Matchweeks are scheduled across
five different days: Saturday, Sunday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday.
Each week, matches from each of
the five classes (A through E) are assigned to a specific day. For example:
Class A → Saturday
Class B → Sunday
Class C → Tuesday
Class D → Wednesday
Class E → Thursday
The rotation will alternate
weekly, ensuring fairness in exposure.
Especially on weekends, staggered
kickoff times will help maximize viewership across multiple fixtures.
This ensures that each class gets
the spotlight, and fans can follow full matchdays of their tier without
distractions from higher-ranked teams playing simultaneously.
Rethinking the Country
Coefficient Model
Let’s now address a structural
issue tied closely to this project:
Is the current country
coefficient system truly fair?
Does it actually reflect the
strength of an entire footballing nation?
In my model, instead of having
just 4–5 clubs represent a country in Europe, 20 clubs from each nation will
compete and contribute to the country's international ranking. This creates a
more inclusive and accurate picture of a nation's footballing depth and
strength.
Fixing a Major Flaw in the
Current European Format
There’s also a competitive
inconsistency in the existing UEFA format.
Take, for example, Liverpool, who
may top the new Champions League league phase, yet be eliminated by PSG in the
round of 16 and fail to even reach the quarter-finals.
The same issue existed in the
previous group-stage model:
A team could win a “group of
death,” only to be knocked out in the round of 16 by a second-placed giant like
Barcelona.
In contrast, my system involves
every team playing every other team in their group, home and away.
The champion, therefore, emerges
as a true winner, having consistently proven themselves over the course of the
entire campaign.
A Major Obstacle – Smaller
Nations' Big Clubs
Now, let’s acknowledge what I
believe to be the biggest challenge to this system.
Clubs from nations outside the
top 5 in the country coefficient rankings—such as Benfica, Club Brugge, Celtic,
or Ajax—might be reluctant to join.
Why?
Because under my model, since
their leagues are not in the top five, they won’t be matched against top-tier
clubs like Real Madrid or Bayern Munich regularly. Instead, they’ll be grouped
into one of the five mid-tier national leagues—for example, a league consisting
of clubs from Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium, Czecia , and Turkey.
Even though these teams dominate
their domestic leagues and often qualify for the Champions League under the
current system, the new format might feel like a step back from an exposure
standpoint.
Therefore, gaining support from
these big-name clubs in smaller countries will be one of the most significant
hurdles for the implementation of this project.
We rarely see clubs from the
leagues I’ve previously mentioned—such as Ajax, Celtic, Club Brugge, or
Benfica—reach even the quarter-finals of the Champions League or Europa League.
The main reason is that the overall level of competition in their domestic
leagues isn't high enough. However, this project gives those clubs a chance to
turn that disadvantage into an advantage.
One of the key reasons these
leagues struggle to rise in the UEFA coefficient rankings is that their clubs
are consistently matched against teams from the top five leagues, where
dominance is concentrated. But under this model, if top-tier clubs from the big
five leagues face each other regularly, their win ratios will naturally
decrease, making room for clubs from other leagues to close the gap.
Moreover, I propose that the
country coefficient be based on a single season, not a rolling five-year
average. This makes the system more dynamic and competitive—every club has to
fight for their nation’s standing each year. In nearly every sport, all
competitors start at the same line. But in football, clubs from the top five
leagues begin the race several meters ahead. If these elite clubs truly believe
in their strength, they should have no issue with starting from the same
position as everyone else.
Elevating Domestic Standards
Top clubs must also recognize
that to be truly elite, they need strong domestic competitors. Under this
system, every domestic league will strive to improve—not only to maintain a top
position but also to increase the international credibility of their league.
That means investing in parity, development, and sustainability across the
entire domestic structure.
This format will also eliminate
the predictability and stagnation we currently see in many leagues. In most
domestic leagues, the top three are obvious, one or two clubs are almost
certainly relegated by week 20, and mid-table teams spend the last 10 rounds
playing meaningless matches—neither fighting for European spots nor facing
relegation threats.
While a similar dynamic could
occur in the international phase of my model, the greater parity between teams
and the fact that each match affects seeding and qualification for the
following season ensures that every match remains meaningful.
What About Leagues Outside the
Top 20?
A valid concern is what happens
to clubs and leagues ranked outside the top 20. If the initial implementation
only includes the top 20 associations, how do the rest develop? How do they
remain connected to the global football structure?
This is a critical question, and
while I don't offer a definitive solution here, I recognize the need for a
parallel development strategy. These clubs must not be excluded, and pathways
for progression, both sporting and financial, must be provided.
A Balanced Vision, Not a
Breakaway
Let me be clear: I am completely
opposed to the original Super League proposal as envisioned by the founding
clubs—especially its closed and exclusive nature. However, their concerns must
still be acknowledged and addressed. If ignored, we risk a dangerous
fragmentation within the sport.
My proposal is not perfect. There
may be flaws I have not yet considered. Perhaps readers of this text will spot
deeper structural issues. But the goal was to create a more inclusive,
forward-looking vision—a structure that balances the desires of top clubs while
offering new opportunities to teams that have spent decades locked in
repetitive domestic cycles.
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